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Abstract
At the moment in several parts of the world institutional reforms are taking place to
deal with integrated water resources management (IWRM) issues. Increasingly intricate
transboundary institutional arrangements will need to be and are established. Lessons
can be learned from frontrunners, but this requires a new method to establish similari-
ties and differences in levels of (de)centralization. In this paper an institutional law &
economics perspective on the study of legal regimes for integrated management of such
complex, multi-use and multi-actor ecosystems will be presented. From this perspective a
new method is developed that can be used for comparative property rights analysis. The
method is based on the combined insights from property rights theory, institutional legal
theory (ILT) and the work of the American legal theorist Hohfeld. The paper will show
how the adapted Schlager & Ostrom framework can be used to better understand the in-
stitutional arrangements used to implement IWRM. The method has been implemented in
a web-based database system. The method incorporates visualization of the legal regimes
and a formal model to establish similarities and differences in levels of (de)centralization
for different policy fields. For the graphical visualizations of the legal regimes Graphviz
is used. The formal model is transposed into SQL-scripts that can be executed through the
website. At the end of the paper a first application of the method in a comparison of the
legal regimes used for the IWRM of the Scheldt estuary, will be presented.
1 Introduction
At the moment in several parts of the world institutional reforms are taking place to deal with
integrated water resources management (IWRM) issues. Current institutional arrangements
are adapted and new ones are established to fulfil the need for more decentralized decision
making. This in turn leads to a need for more centralized coordination, because the mechanisms
and authorities for management reside with multiple actors that function on different levels of
society. Multiple actors are involved due to the fact that the legal standards governing land,
water and (natural) resources are not very coordinated and often address single resources rather
than the ecological complex itself. The ecological complex is also very big, so it crosses several
jurisdictional borders. This adds a new level of complexity to the issue of IWRM.
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As a result of these observations increasingly intricate transboundary institutional arrange-
ments will need to be and are established. These institutional arrangements must constitute a
nested system of powers and authorities to accommodate for the need for decentralization and
coordination. In other words, there is a need to develop ‘nested enterprises’ or ‘polycentric
institutions’.
The best way forward is to observe and learn from current best practices used by frontrun-
ners. That means that we should make systematic examination of variations in the relationships
between resource management, decentralization and legal regimes and how these variations af-
fect the integrated management of resources (Agrawal, 2001). No study like this has been done
before. Our method is not capable of performing this task, but it is a good first step towards
such an analysis. Through our method one can determine to which degree decision making has
been (de)centralized and on which level the legal regime can be adapted to local situations. In
order to do this, one needs an analysis method that is able to make systematic descriptions of
legal regimes that can be used for comparative analysis and at the same time can handle huge
quantities of data.
In this paper we will show in two parts a method, its tools and its theoretical basis, that is
able to fulfil the task described above. First, we will show the theoretical basis (section 3)for
the method. On the basis of these theories it is possible to make systematic description that can
be used for comparative property rights analysis (section 5.4.1). In the second part of the paper
we present the formal model (section 6) and its implementation (section 7). In a third part we
will go into the future developments/evolutions of our method and its tools (section 8).
2 Problem statements
When researching legal regimes, one has to look at a lot of different statutes, regulation, case
law, etc., to get the full picture. This should be done in several states and/or countries, because
when one wants to research legal regimes for IWRM one has to realize that he is dealing with
a transboundary resource that is spread over several and different jurisdictions. During the
process of gathering all the necessary information, one discovers that you then run into several
scientific and practical problems.
The scientific problems have mainly to do with making comparisons of legal regimes orig-
inating in different legal systems. In our research we would like to study a legal regime orig-
inating in the (European) civil law system and one from a (American) common law system.
These legal systems differ in many ways. A lot of researchers start comparing by looking
with ‘glasses’ focused by their own legal system. This yields descriptions biased towards their
own legal system. Furthermore, it is not enough to determine that different legal systems have
components with similar names, because in reality they can have different contents.
Successful, unbiased analysis requires that you need a method that is capable of describing
the components of a legal system, the logical relationships between them, and the ways in
which all legal phenomena and operations in the legal system can be described in the terms
of these components and relations (MacCormick and Weinberger, 1992). That means that you
need frameworks that are based on some sort of common denominator that is able to describe
legal regimes in term of their ‘building blocks’(Wessel, 1999; vanWageningen, 2003). To solve




• able to compare rules originating in different legal systems
• able to describe building blocks of legal regimes
• unbiased descriptions
Table 1: Scientific requirements of a method for comparative analysis of legal regimes
One of the major practical problems is the amount of data generated. When describing
a legal regime that is used for integrated water management, one is dealing with rules from
several legal fields. That means one has to look at the rules related to management of water
(quantity, quality and allocation of water), land (planning, zoning, spatial development, perhaps
agriculture and industry), land-water interaction and property in general. That means one will
be gathering data from a lot of different statutes, regulation and case law. Each one of these legal
sources contains at least several (case law), but sometimes hundreds (statutes & regulation) of
rules. That means that you need some sort of database system to store and handle such amounts
of data.
Practical requirements:
• must be able to handle huge quantities of data
• must be able to implement formal approach of comparison
• must be accessible from multiple workplaces
Table 2: Practical requirements of a method for comparative analysis of legal regimes
But storing data is not enough, you also want to compare these different rules/regimes to
discern differences and similarities. This can be done in two ways. One way is visualization.
Visualization eases insight into complex systems, so it can help with analyzing these complex
legal regimes. Visualization can be done by making graphical representations of the regimes
by drawing graphs of the legal regimes. These graphs can help someone observe differences
and similarities by comparing the resulting graphs. The second manner is to compare the legal
actors and rules on the basis of meaningfully combined data. Differences can be established
by looking at aggregated positions of entities and (the content of) their relationships with other
entities. This way one can discern if differently named entities still have the same position or
relations with similar entities. Or the other way around. A formal representation of our method
of establishing similarities and differences can be found in section 6.
We have solved both problems by designing a web-based database system. This system is
able to render legal regimes into graphs and capable of making detailed and condensed compar-
isons of the data stored in the database. More about the practical side of our system in section
7. But first we will present the theoretical basis1 used for generating the necessary description
that is the basis for our web-based database system.
1This section is for the most part based on a paper Wim van de Griendt will be presenting at the ESNIE 2006
Summerschool from May 15th to May 20th in Corsica (France). An older version has been presented at the
USGS-workshop ‘Institutional Analysis for Environmental Decision-making: A Workshop’, January 28 and 29,
2005, Fort Collins Science Center, Fort Collins, USA
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3 Theoretical basis
Institutional arrangements are considered to provide the mechanisms by which individuals
can resolve such social dilemmas (Steins, 1999). They are complexes composed of ‘rights’
(claims, duties, privileges and exposures), taking various forms across different types of re-
sources and/or different institutional contexts (Cole, 2000). These arrangements define and
restrict access to and control over resources, giving appropriate incentives to users and theoret-
ically guaranteeing the sustainability of natural resources (Ostrom et al., 1999). In other words,
for the governance of the natural resources a legal regime is created Bromley (1991). This way
a ‘tragedy of the commons’ can be averted.
Hardin (1968) already saw two solutions for restricting/controlling access and use, namely
privatization and regulation. Privatization means that a decision unit must be given private
ownership of its resource. One person is given absolute control over access and no one may
legally exploit it without his authorization. The other option is regulation. Regulation can take
the form of government-regulation or self-regulation by user groups. Both regimes will reduce
or eliminate incentives to over exploitation, by (self) imposed restrictions on users and modes
of use.
Almost all economic scholars discussing the alternative options of privatization and regula-
tion fail to discern that both are property-based (Cole, 2002). Regulation cannot exist without a
legal regime giving some decision units, the state or a group of (self-regulating) users, control
over (some part) of a resource. The difference between the two is not the existence or non-
existence of property rights, but the type of property rights regime used (Cole, 2002). This
means that legal regimes and the rules they contain can be described and analyzed in terms of
property rights.
To manage such (potential) resource use conflicts, one must choose the right mix of pri-
vate, community and state property rights to address environmental problems. Together they
can constitute successful institutional arrangements with the ability to address the problems
associated with the use of CPR’s. But to really be successful, they should provide the needed
flexibility to adapt to local conditions. This requires a certain degree of decentralization of nat-
ural resources management. Stakeholders, like the government and (local) user groups, must
manage the natural resources together. Therefore institutional arrangements (polycentric insti-
tutions/nested enterprises) 2 must be established which constitute nested powers and authorities,
collective action and coordinated decision-making. These institutional arrangements enable lo-
cal users to adapt their local rules to their local subsystem, but at the same time they also enable
coordination of rules/decisions on the (eco)system or in the case of water ecosystems, on the
watershed/catchment basin level.
4 Institutional analysis
Therefore it is not surprising that in the current literature on natural resources management,
much attention is given to the importance of institutional arrangements (see for instance Os-
trom (1990); Veeman and Politylo (2003); Cortner et al. (1998)). Especially in cases, where
2Ostrom’s eight design principle for successful management of common pool resources, see Ostrom (1990).
With this Ostrom means that management of common pool resources must be organized in multiple layers (where
one layer/organization is nested within/ is part of another (higher) layer/organization).
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the responsibility for natural resources is looked at from integrated ecosystem or landscape
perspectives (So¨derqvist et al., 2000).
In the past much research has been conducted concerning the effects of single (legal) rules.
Nowadays, research concentrates on the role of (legal) rules in the wider context of, so called,
‘institutional configurations’ (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) governing natural resources. This
purpose requires institutional theories 3 that provide frameworks for detailed analysis which
can also be used as the basis of comparative economic analysis.
The aim of this article is to show that a new combination of current institutional theories is
able to provide the necessary frameworks and descriptions. In this article, a legal theoretical
view of regimes for governing natural resources is taken as a starting point. This article presents
the ‘underlying unities in legal doctrines and institutions’ (Posner, 2004). With the help of these
‘underlying unities’ one can determine the property rights assigned to the different actors. The
type of ownership of the actors can be determined to look at the bundle of property rights they
hold. This bundle determines to which degree the actor has control over access to and use of the
resources and to which extent he has control over the property rights of others. By comparing
the actors, their bundles of property rights and their type of ownership one can determine if
there are differences in (de)centralization and who can change the rules so that the legal regime
can adapt.
5 Legal institutions
A legal framework that can provide the necessary descriptions for comparative research must be
capable of comparing legal regimes without reference to the legal systems (common, civil, etc.)
in which the legal regimes are ‘located’. Successful analysis requires that the theory is capable
of describing the components of a legal system, the logical relationships between them, and the
ways in which all legal phenomena and operations in the legal system can be described in the
terms of these components and relations (MacCormick and Weinberger, 1992). Therefore in
this section we look upon the Institutional Legal Theory (ILT)4 and the work of the American
legal theorist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.
5.1 Institutional Legal Theory
Ruiter (1993; 1994; 2001) developed the Institutional Legal Theory, building upon the work of
MacCormick and Weinberger (1986). ILT analyzes the legal order as a universe consisting of a
multitude of relatively independent systems of rules (legal institutions). It opens up possibilities
for analyzing legal orders as highly complex over-all systems of rules that are all reducible
to a small number of basic patterns (Ruiter, 1997). For that reason, ILT can help analyze
‘institutional configurations’, where traditional legal theory only concentrates on logical and
other relations between single legal norms and rules (Ruiter, 1993, 2001).
3Diermeier and Krehbiel (2003) make a distinction between institutional theories and theories of institutions.
They state that an institutional theory ‘seeks an understanding of the relations between institutions, behaviour and
outcomes’ while a theory of institutions seeks ‘explanation why some institutional features come into existence,
and persist, while others are either non-existent or transient’.
4Others refer to it as the Institutional Theory of Law (ITL), see MacCormick and Weinberger (1992).
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The other main reasons for choosing ILT and its legal institutions lies in the fact that by
describing legal regimes in terms of legal institutions, they can be compared systematically.5
Many researchers comparing different laws or legal regimes compare them without the use
of a common denominator. As a result their descriptions may become distorted as they com-
pare concepts which seemingly have the same name, but in reality have different contents. In
addition, they compare by looking with lenses focused by their own legal system, yielding
descriptions biased towards their own legal system.
By using ILT a researcher stays clear of these problems when describing, analyzing and
comparing legal regimes. This is possible, because ILT is a legal meta-language, which en-
ables the comparison of legal regimes with the help of the common denominator(s) it presents
(van Wageningen, 2003). The legal institutions of ILT are this denominator which enable a
researcher to name all ‘building blocks’ (MacCormick and Weinberger, 1992; Wessel, 1999)
which comprise legal regimes. All legal regimes can be rendered in the same basic forms with
the same terms for their content (range of behaviour). This is the basis a researcher needs for
the comparison of legal regimes which are part of other legal systems and/or several different
jurisdictions.
But for our research this is not enough. The descriptions of legal regimes should be usable
for determining levels of (de)centralization. This is indeed possible, by combining the detailed
and systematic descriptions of legal regimes with Hohfeldian legal relations (5.2). These two
elements generate the basis for a property rights analysis (5.4.1).
5.1.1 Legal institutions
But what are legal institutions? To understand this, we will first take a look at the concept of
institutions. Nelson and Sampat (2001) have reviewed the literature dealing with the question
how institutions affect economic performance. Their survey reveals that the concept of an
‘institution’ means different things to different scholars, both within economics and across
social sciences. The question they raise is whether the concept has a single coherent meaning,
and their answer is in the negative.
Although such a unified content may be lacking, there appears to be general agreement on
a broad conception of institutions as systems of rules that provide frameworks for social action
within larger rule-governed settings. Keman (1997) surveyed a great number of definitions of
institutions used in neo-institutionalists approaches. He found the following general concept
of institutions: sets of rules that occur in social reality in the form of recurrent behaviour that
complies with those rules. Institutions are not only effect-producing, but also distinct “realities
that shape patterns of behaviour of individuals, groups and organizations” (Keman, 1997).
This definition of institutions is used as a point of reference (Ruiter, 2001) in ILT. Legal
institutions are systems of legal rules governing specific social action in the context of a com-
prehensive social order, which purport to meet with general acceptance. General acceptance
means that they are socially taken into account as a factual situation (Ruiter, 2004).
If legal institutions are socially taken to be taken into account as factual situations, their
form must be such that they can actually be conceived of as particular situations. That is to say,
as existent. There are three basis forms of particular situations6:
5ILT is already applied in different fields, for instance international organizations (Wessel, 1999), universities
(van Wageningen, 2003) and municipalities (Ruiter, 1995).
6See also Ruiter (1997).
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1. The existence of a certain entity. (There is an Eiffeltower.)
2. A certain existing entity having a certain property. (The Eiffeltower is made of steel.)
3. Certain existing entities having a certain connection. (The Eiffeltower is near the Lou-
vre.)
The category of entities can be further divided in two: subjects, which can perform acts, and
objects, which can be acted upon. With the aid of both distinctions, a classification of particular
situations and also of legal institutions can be constructed. This classification is exhaustive, as
there are subjects and objects, which can only have a limited number of relations (Wessel,
2001). The different kinds of legal institutions can be characterized as follows(Ruiter, 1997,
2001, 2004):
Legal Persons A legal person is a valid legal re´gime with the form of an entity
that can act. Example: the European Community.
Legal Objects A legal object is a valid legal re´gime with the form of an entity
that can serve as the object of (trans)actions. Example: a conveyable right of
ownership.
Legal Qualities A legal quality is a valid legal re´gime with the form of a char-
acteristic of a subject. The legal regime regulates the behavioural relation
between that particular subject and all other subjects. Example: a person’s
legal majority.
Legal Status A legal status is a valid legal re´gime with the form of a characteris-
tic of an object. The legal regime regulates the behavioural relations between
particular subjects responsible for that object and all others subjects. Exam-
ple: a listed historical monument.
Legal Connections A personal legal connection is a valid legal re´gime with the
form of a connection between subjects. The legal regime regulates the be-
havioural relations between those particular subjects. Example: a personal
right.
Legal Configurations A legal configuration is a valid legal re´gime with the form
of a connection between objects. The legal regime regulates the behavioural
relations between particular subjects with certain relations towards each of
the objects. Example: an easement, that is, a legal re´gime with the form of a
connection between a servient tenement and a dominant tenement consisting
in a burden (e.g. a right of way) laid on the former for the benefit of the
latter. All successive owners of the servient tenement are obligated to bear
the burden and all successive owners of the dominant tenement are entitled to
treat the former as thus obligated.
Objective Legal Connections An objective legal connection is a valid legal re´gime
with the form of connection between a subject and an object. The legal regime
regulates the behavioural relations between a particular subject in the legal
connection and all other subjects. Example: ownership of property.
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5.1.2 Content of legal institutions
The previous section discussed different forms of legal institutions as distinguished by ILT.
However, in order to make an adequate and correct analysis of legal institutions possible, a
theory must not only take notice of different forms, but also take their contents into account
(Coleman and Kraus, 1986). ILT identifies as contents of legal institutions their ‘ranges of
behaviour’. That is, the behavioural patterns regulated by them. These behavioural patterns
can be captured by using the rights concepts of Hohfeld (1919). Hohfeld has succeeded in
reducing the language of the law to a few essential and fundamental legal concepts answering
to the standards of simplicity, precision, and universality (Hoebel, 1968). They are fundamental
because they ‘express the vitally important relations of men with each other in any judicial or
governmental system’ (Corbin, 1964).
5.2 Hohfeld
Hohfeld was driven by his dissatisfaction with the indiscriminate use of the term ‘right’ in
the legal practice of his time. Judging by common legal uses of the word ‘right’, Hohfeld
noticed that the idea of someone’s having a right to something is really a cluster of related
ideas. This causes much unnecessary ambiguity. Contrary to the saying that for every right
there is a correlative duty, he pointed out that some rights have such correlates while others do
not (Perry, 1977). His analysis of fundamental legal relations was intended to show that the
term ‘right’ is used in four different senses. For this purpose, Hohfeld distinguishes four legal
relations, which contain his eight fundamental conceptions. These conceptions constitute the
‘lowest common denominators of the law’ (Hohfeld, 1919).
Hohfeld started his analysis by stating that ‘rights’ are used in a very broad sense, and
used to denote very different concepts. Therefore he tried to limit the concept to a coherent
set of concepts, or ‘relations’ as Hohfeld calls them, with definite and appropriate meanings.
The first set of concepts is claim-duty. This means that someone (A) who has a duty, has a
legal obligation towards the claim-holder (B) to take or refrain from taking a certain course of
conduct (Co).7 B’s claim that A should or shouldn’t do something is equivalent to A’s duty
towards B to take that course of conduct like he is obliged to do. Hohfeld calls equivalent legal
conceptions ‘jural correlatives’, which means that the existence of one necessarily implies the
other. If such concepts cannot exist together in one person in respect of the same thing, he calls
them ‘opposites’ (Kamba, 1974).
The second legal relation Hohfeld discerns is the one between ‘privilege’ and ‘no-claim’.
A ‘privilege’ means that A may or may not do as he chooses. In equivalent terms, a privilege
means that A is not under a duty to perform some action, in contrary, he is free8 to choose the
course of conduct he wants to take. This means that B cannot claim that A should take some
course of action, therefore his positions is named ‘no-claim’. Yet conversely, B may interfere
with A. This is possible because A does not have a claim against B (because B has no duty not
to interfere).
The first order set of Hohfeld’s legal relations discussed above, are found in table 3.
7We use the notation of Ross (1974) of A–B (Co) instead of Hohfelds X-Y, because this fits better with our
information costs analysis.
8Of course this freedom is not unlimited. Some restrictions are set, but within these restrictions, a person is
free to do whatever he wants.
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duty A–B (Co) jural correlative claim B–A (Co)
jural opposite jural opposite
privilege A–B (Co) jural correlative no-claim B–A (Co)
Table 3: Hohfeld’s first order set of legal relations
‘Power’ and ‘exposure’ are the third Hohfeldian relation. ‘Power’ is the legal capacity to
alter legal relations. It is one’s affirmative control over a given relation as against another.
These other persons are exposed to the power of the former, and have no capability to ‘fend
off’ the changes decided upon by the person having a power they are exposed to. To the degree
that alterable relations are fundamental legal relations of the first order, this amounts to legal
capacity of replacing existing duty-claim-relations by liberty-no-claim-relations and vice versa.
However, although Hohfeld himself does not elaborate on this implication, ‘power’ may also
be the legal capacity to alter legal relations of the second order. This amounts to the legal
capacity of replacing existing power-exposure-relations by disability-immunity-relations and
vice versa. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that fundamental legal relations of the first
and second orders need not be between the same persons. In many situations, A and B have
either a duty-claim-relation or a liberty-no-claim-relation, while commonly having a power-
exposure-relation or a disability-immunity-relation with C concerning their first-order legal
relation. In such tripartite relations, C is legally (in)capable of changing an existing first-order
legal relation between A and B (Ruiter, 2003)
The fourth and last of Hohfeld’s legal relations is the one between ‘immunity’ and ‘disabil-
ity’. An immunity means that A is exempted from the effect B’s power. This means that legal
relations vested in A cannot be changed by the acts of B. In other words, B is under a disability
in regard to changing the relations A has with B or a third party.
The second order set of Hohfelds’ legal relations discussed above, are found in table 4.
power A–B (Co) jural correlative exposure B–A (Co)
jural opposite jural opposite
disability A–B (Co) jural correlative immunity B–A (Co)
Table 4: Hohfeld’s second order set of legal relations
5.2.1 Hohfeld and Legal institutions
When looking at the descriptions of legal institutions, one can start to wonder to what extent all
the Hohfeld relations can form the content of several legal institutions that are not of the basic
form of a relation between one or two subjects and/or objects. This is indeed true for the legal
institutions ‘legal person’ and ‘legal object’. These two forms are only basic forms to which
legal relations can be attached.9 that make up the other five legal institutions. The rules of the
legal institutions of ‘legal connection’, ‘legal configuration’ and ‘objective legal connections’
are obviously fit to be described in terms of legal relations. The rules of these legal institutions
regulate the relationship between one (group/class of) person or object and another (group/class
9They do have a content, but that content is more internally oriented. The content they have is how they can
be formatted, how they can be abolished, how the internal decision-making takes place and in case of objects and
legal persons not being a natural person, who may represent it.
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of) person or object. But also the legal institutions ‘legal quality’ and ‘legal status’, although
seemingly not of the form fit for a relation, can have legal relations attached to it. This comes
through the fact that these forms contain essentially relations of the nature 1 vs. all. That means
that these rules regulate the relations between the object or person against all other persons or
objects. But it will not be described in this way in our database. This has to do with the fact
that it is strange to add either all other entities listed in the database as either target or source
entity of the relation, or to add a new entity called ”All”. There is no good solution to this, so
we will only record the legal conception (one of the eight) on the part of the entity and not on
the part of all other entities.
5.3 Comparative analysis
By describing a legal regime in terms of legal institutions and their contents, it is possible to
make unbiased descriptions based on a common denominator. But this is not enough. These
descriptions should also be useful to determine the degree of (de)centralization within the dif-
ferent legal regimes. This can be assessed by determining the rights and capacities that are
transferred to actors at lower levels of organization(Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001). For this we
turn in the next section to property rights theory, and especially one of the approaches used
within the natural resources management literature. The Schlager & Ostrom framework for
determining types of owners by looking at their property rights, can help us examine the degree
of (de)centralization.
5.4 Property rights analysis
Property rights are systems of legal relations that ‘link a person to an object against all other per-
sons’ (Bromley, 1989). Property rights compromise complex aggregates of legal relationships
made up of claims, privileges, powers and immunities (Hohfeld, 1919)10, which can be seen as
a ‘bundle of rights’(Penner, 1996). Property rights are thought of as a bundle in the sense that
a general description of them will allow for some kind of subdivision into ‘elementary rights’.
This leaves us two options for analysis, namely looking at what (constellation of rights)
constitutes an owner or analyzing the object to which an owner is linked. Both are possible and
meaningful with the descriptions made11. We have chosen for the moment to only go forward
with the first option. That means we will analyze the legal relations and see which (bundle of)
property rights they assign to the actors/owners in the legal regime.
There are different conceptions of the bundles of rights, because the rules of specification
may vary. This leads to differing views about the concept of ownership and what constitutes
an owner. We are looking for a concept of ownership that can help us assess the rights and
capacities that are transferred to actors at lower levels of organization. That means it should
make a distinction between levels of rights, which can connect to levels of organization or
policy. The concept should also be (more) tuned to the specific needs of analysis of ownership
in relation to natural resources. That means it should pay explicit attention to the rules for
10These aggregates can differ between people. Hohfeld uses on p.30 the example of the difference between the
fee simple owner and the easement owner;‘the fee simple owner’s aggregate of legal relations is far more extensive
than the aggregate of the easement owner’.
11The second option will be presented as a future development in section 8.2. More detailed information can be
found in van de Griendt (2005).
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governing access to and use of the resource. Our choice has fallen on the concept of ownership
of Schlager and Ostrom (1992; 1996) Their conceptualization fulfils all the requirements set
above. It is also one of the most used conceptualizations in the natural resources literature. The
concept of Schlager and Ostrom will be discussed in the next paragraphs.
5.4.1 Schlager & Ostrom’s ownership types
Schlager and Ostrom present ‘a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regime that
distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights that may be held by the users of a resource
system’. They distinguish five classes of property rights holders: owner, proprietor, authorized
claimant, authorized user and authorized entrant. Each position has its own associated bundle
of rights containing one or more property rights. Schlager and Ostrom discern five different
property rights(p.250-251), which they define as:
access The right to enter a defined physical property.
withdrawal The right to obtain the ‘products’ of a resource (e.g., catch fish, appropriate water,
etc.).
management The right to regulate internal use patterns and to transform a resource by making
improvements.
exclusion The right to determine who will have an access right, and how that right may be
transferred.
alienation The right to sell or lease either or both of the above-mentioned collective-choice
rights.
You can see them as a three level scheme. Level 1 contains the rules for access to and
withdrawal from the resource. Level 2 holds the rights (management and exclusion) that can
set and change the rules of level 1. On Level 3 (alienation) we can find the rules that determine
who may use the rights of level 3 and 2, and who may give instructions to level 2 right-holders
containing the conditions under which the level 2 right-holders may use their rights.
Schlager and Ostrom are talking about rights, but Hohfeld has taught us that there are no
such things as rights. So with what kind of Hohfeldian relations (see table 5) are we dealing
here? A right of access gives the holder a privilege to enter the property while simultaneously
giving others a no-claim towards this person. This means that they cannot claim that the priv-
ilege holder must take some course of action. On the other hand, it does not mean that the
no-claim holders must/can not interfere with the latter’s access. A situation of non-interference
can only exist if the privilege is reinforced with claim rights, giving persons other than the priv-
ilege holder a duty not to interfere. A subject with withdrawal rights have a privilege to obtain
products produced by the resource, meaning that others cannot claim that he should not take
them. Here exists the same situation as with access rights: they must be reinforced with claim
rights before a situation of non-interference comes into existence. A person with management
rights has a power because he has the capacity to change the relations between himself and
other people wanting withdrawal rights. If he has not given them ‘rights’, they are under a
duty to not take any products. If he uses his power and gives them rights, the legal situation
and legal relations changes. Then the ‘manager’ is in a no-claim position towards the persons
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taking products. This is the same for exclusion rights: the person holding them has a power for
granting other access rights. Also the right of alienation is a power, as the owner of this right
may change his position to the object in relation to others, letting someone else partly or totally
take over his position. For that to happen, he must change the legal relation between himself
and the new ‘owner’. Because he has transferred some of his rights, he can no longer claim that
the new ‘owner’ should refrain from taking a course of action in relation to the object.
Schlager & Ostrom Hohfeld
access privilege to enter a defined physical property
withdrawal privilege to the products of an object
management power to determine usage of object
exclusion power to determine access to object
alienation power to transfer rights
Table 5: Property rights of Schlager & Ostrom in Hohfeldian terms
Table 6 shows how these property rights enable us to make distinctions among the different







Access x x x x x
Withdrawal x x x x
Management x x x
Exclusion x x
Alienation x
Table 6: Bundles of rights associated with types of owners(Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; Ostrom
and Schlager, 1996)
Individuals holding only access rights are called ‘Authorized Entrants’ by Schlager & Os-
trom. An example is the tourist who buys a ticket to visit a national park. If individuals also
hold withdrawal rights, they are called ‘authorized users’. If specified in the rules, these access
and withdrawal rights could be temporarily (lease) or permanently (sale, granted or assigned)
transferred to others. One example is persons holding permits or individual transferable quo-
tas. The rights of access and withdrawal are determined by the persons holding management
(for withdrawal) and exclusion (for access) rights. ‘Authorized Claimants’ have, next to their
access and withdrawal rights, management rights. This means they may devise a set of with-
drawal rules, with which they determine and coordinate usage of the resource, but they cannot
determine who has access to the resource. One example is a group of professional fishermen
together determining the fishing rules for their joint property, but not for the sporting fishermen
using the same ‘piece’ of water. People with an extra exclusion right are called ‘Proprietors’.
Proprietors decide who may have access to the resource and how it may be utilized, but they
may not sell it. One example is a committee of stakeholders’ representatives governing the us-
age of a resource, but not authorized to sell the property. The right of alienation is only reserved
for ‘Owners’. Owners have the complete bundle of rights.
The Schlager-Ostrom conceptualization is based on and applied to single-use and local-
community level institutional arrangements, mostly local fishery or lobster communities (see
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their examples in their 1992 article). For our purpose, the analysis of multi-level and multi-use
CPR, the conceptualization must be adapted to accommodate for the positions of governmental
(the state and its agencies) and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s). Therefore we pro-
pose a new type of owner, the trustee (see table 7). A trustee is a not self-interested actor, but
he is goal oriented and in a principal-agent relation towards this goal set by others. This means
that he does not act on his own behalf, but on the behalf of others or certain objects. This is
quite different from the ‘owners’ of Schlager and Ostrom who act in their own best interest.
The ‘trustee’ is an agent of the beneficiaries12 and tries acting in their best interest. A trustee
is not acting on his behalf, but serving a ‘higher purpose’. To do this, he needs a bundle of
rights that contain management rights, exclusion rights and alienation rights. With these rights
he can control the usage and access to the resource in the best interest of the beneficiaries. Such
a position would be useful in cases where a large group of people is joint owner of a resource.
To achieve an optimal allocation or maximized welfare, it is necessary that activities of users
are coordinated/restricted. Since the people themselves cannot come to an agreement about
the usage of the resource, due to high transaction costs, they partially transfer their rights to a
trustee. Such a trustee would then regulate and coordinate the usage of the resource on behalf
of the people.






Access x x x x x
Withdrawal x x x x
Management x x x x
Exclusion x x x
Alienation x x
Table 7: Adapted version of table ‘Bundles of rights associated with types of owners’
With these six types of owners and the three levels of property rights one is able to determine
the extent to which claims, privileges, powers and immunities are transferred to actors at lower
levels of organization. By knowing at which levels the powers and/or types of owners are
located, one can also get a view on the abilities of the legal regime to adapt to local situations.
In the next section our formal model, representing the comparative analysis of our method, will
be discussed.
6 Formal Model
In this section we define the mathematical basis for the comparison of two legal arrangements.
Obviously we are only interested in the similarities between legal arrangements that are con-
cerned with the same policy area, e.g. water quality management, water quantity management,
spatial planning, etc. Therefore, in the remainder, the policy area is considered a parameter for
the comparison and thus fixed.




First we define several sets which embody the concepts as discussed in the preceding sections.
• HoF is the set of 2×4= 8 legal relations of Hohfeld:
HoF= { claim duty, privilege noclaim, power exposure, immunity disability, duty claim,
noclaim privilege, exposure power, disability immunity }
• PR is the set of property rights:
PR= { ro-access, ro-withdrawal, ro-management, ro-exclusion, ro-alienation },
where “ro” stands for “right-of”.
• Levels is the set of levels on which entities are defined. Levels= { International, National,
State, Province, Region, Local }.
6.1.1 Legal arrangement L.
A legal arrangement L can be seen as a set of legal rules. Each rule relates a set of source
entities es to a set of target entities et. EntL is the set of all entities that appear in L. An entity
is either an object or subject. In the remainder we do not make a distinction between objects
and subjects. Each entity e ∈ EntL has a fixed level(e) ∈ Levels associated.
6.1.2 Rule r.
Formally, a rule r ∈ L is a tuple (nr,es,et,hf ,co,prox,pres,pret), where
• nr is a unique key (i.e. a unique number) identifying this rule within the legal arrangement
L,
• es⊆ EntL are the source entities of the rule. We denote the entities of es by es1,es2 . . .
• et ⊆ EntL are the target entities of the rule. We denote the entities of et by et1,et2 . . .
• hf ∈ HoF is the Hohfeld relation of this rule, relating the entities in es to et,
• co is the range of behaviour or conduct that is regulated between the entities es and et,
• prox is the proxy this rule is related to,
• pres ⊆ PR is the set of property rights for the entities in es, and
• pret ⊆ PR is the set of property rights for the entities in et.
For convenience we use the names of the elements of the tuple to select the particular elements
from a rule r. For example, the function es(r) returns the set of source entities of rule r and
pres(r) returns the set of property rights for these source entities in rule r. You will notice that
the elements hf , co and prox are not used in the remained of this formal model. These three
elements are already taken up in the tuple that describes the content of a rule, because they are




We define the function ent(r) which returns the set of all entities appearing in rule r, i.e.




Furthermore, given a rule r and an entity e ∈ EntL, the function prr(r,e) returns the set of
property rights for the entity e as defined by rule r, i.e.
pr(r,e) = { ro | r← L, e ∈ es(r), ro← pres(r) } ∪
{ ro | r← L, e ∈ et(r), ro← pret(r) }
Note that pr(r,e) might well be the empty set for a given rule r and entity e.
We use the function pr to define the function all pr(e) which returns the set of all property
rights of the given entity e, i.e.
all pr(e) = {ro | r← L, ro← pr(r,e)}
The function all pr(e) can be used to determine the property type of the entity e due to Schlager
& Ostrom, e.g. Owner, Trustee, Proprietor, etc.
Given an entity e, we are also interested in all entities that are related to e by some rule. The
function tgt(e) gives all the target entities of e, whereas src(e) gives all the source entities of
e13, i.e.
tgt(e) = { t | r← L, e ∈ es(r), t ∈ et(r) }
src(e) = { s | r← L, s ∈ es(r), e ∈ et(r) }
Now the following holds:
∀es ∈ EntL,∀et ∈ EntL • et ∈ tgt(es)⇔ es ∈ src(et)
6.2 Graph GL.
A legal arrangement L can be seen as a directed graph, induced by the rules of L. The nodes of
this graph are the entities of L and the edges are the source-target relations between the entities,
due to the rules.
We formally define he graph GL as GL= (EntL,RelL), where EntL are the nodes of the graph
GL and RelL are the edges between the entities. RelL ⊆ EntL×L×EntL is defined as:
RelL = { (ex,r,ey) | r← L, ex← es(r), ey← et(r) }
In other words, each rule r in L defines pair-wise edges between the source entities es and the
target entities et of r. So there is an edge from ex and ey if ey ∈ tgt(ex). The edge between ex
and ey is labelled by the rule r which relates the two entities. There may very well be several
edges between two entities, each labelled by different rules.
13 The notation tgt stands for target and src stands for source.
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6.3 Comparison.
We are interested in comparing two legal arrangements LA and LB, more specifically the entities
of both arrangements. As said before, the policy areas of the two arrangements under compari-
son is the same and fixed. We now define several equivalence relations∼i, which relate entities
ea from LA and eb from LB.
0. Property rights. Two entities are related via the (weakest) relation ∼0 if the property
rights of both entities are the same.
ea ∼0 eb ⇔ all pr(ea) = all pr(eb)
1. Level. For ∼1, apart from the property rights, the entities should have the same level of
authority.
ea ∼1 eb ⇔ ea ∼0 eb ∧
level(ea) = level(eb)
Comparable number of related entities. Two entities are related via ∼c if the entities have
comparable number of related entities, i.e. the number of target- and source entities should be
more or less equal.
ea ∼c eb ⇔ abs(|tgt(ea)| − |tgt(eb)|) ≤ n ∧
abs(|src(ea)| − |src(eb)|) ≤ n
Here, n is either a constant (e.g. 1) or a function which depends on the functions tgt and/or src
of both entities, e.g. n= 0.25×max(tgt(ea),src(eb)). This relation ∼c is used in the following
two relations.
2a. Same level of jurisdiction. Here we are interested in similar entities on the same level of
jurisdiction, i.e.
ea ∼2a eb ⇔ ea ∼1 eb ∧ ea ∼c eb
2b. (De)centralized jurisdiction. We are also interested in entities that are similar but are
not on the same level. This relation shows related entities which differ in centralized and
decentralized jurisdiction. So,
ea ∼2b eb ⇔ ea ∼0 eb ∧ level(ea) 6= level(eb) ∧ ea ∼c eb
3. Every target entity has a comparable peer. For the strongest relation∼3, we require that
the target entities of both ea and eb are themselves related via ∼0, i.e. have the same property
rights.
ea ∼3 eb ⇔ ea ∼2i eb ∧
∀ei ∈ tgt(ea) ∃e j ∈ tgt(eb) : ei ∼0 e j ∧
∀ei ∈ tgt(eb) ∃e j ∈ tgt(ea) : ei ∼0 e j
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where ∼2i is either ∼2a or ∼2b.
These are the equivalence relations that form the basis of our comparative analysis. Since
we are dealing with legal regimes that are made up out of many rules, we need a tool to automate
the comparative analysis. It is too much to do it by hand. For that reason we have developed a
web-based database system.
7 Implementation
The website is the heart of our tools. Everything happens through this website, namely adding
data, generating new (secondary) data based on the primary input, analyzing data and reporting
results. In the next subsections we will discuss the website and the tool we have used to generate
the graphical visualizations of our legal regimes.
7.1 Basis: Website & PHP &MySQL
The website is made up from two components, namely the database and the forms that are used
to add and extract information from the database.
The database is a MySQL-database (version 4.1.18-nt)/footnoteSoftware, manuals, train-
ing, support, etc. can be found at http://www.mysql.com14. MySQL is the world’s most popular
open source database and it has become the database of choice for a new generation of appli-
cations built on the LAMP (Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP/Perl/Python) or WAMP (Windows,
Apache, MySQL, PHP/Perl/Python) stack. These combinations enable one to build dynamic
websites. In other words, websites that present information that is (partly) stored in and ex-
tracted from a database. This is very helpful if one wants to analyze legal regimes, because
this means storing information about thousands of rules, subjects and objects. The dynamic
website is build with the help of PHP (version 4.4.1)15. PHP is a widely-used general-purpose
scripting language that is especially suited for Web development and can be embedded into
HTML. PHP gives one the opportunity to special commands to communicate with a (My)SQL-
database. Therefore it is possible to make forms that can add information to the database. But
it is also possible that some of the information that is used to make up these forms is extracted
from the database. For instance, if one is analyzing a legal rule and one wants to store in the
database which entities have a legal relationship, it is possible to select these entities from a list
of entities already added to the database.
7.2 Visualization: Graphviz
The graphic visualizations of the legal system are made with the help of the programGraphviz(version
2.8) 16. We were looking for a program that was able to visualize the legal relations between
14The database was managed with the help of phpMyadmin (version 2.6.1.). Currently it can create and drop
databases, create/drop/alter tables, delete/edit/add fields, execute any SQL statement, manage keys on fields, man-
age privileges, export data into various formats and is available in 50 languages. The software can be downloaded
from http://www.phpmyadmin.net
15PHP can be found at http://www.php.net. This site contains the software, manuals, tutorials and support
software.
16The Graphviz software is available at http://www.graphviz.org and at
http://www.research.att.com/sw/tools/graphviz. The Graphviz software is freely available under an open
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entities in a legal regime. Essentially we were looking for a program that can draw graphs,
which are made up out of nodes (entities) and edges (relations). The choice has fallen upon
Graphviz. Graphviz is a collection of software for viewing and drawing attributed graphs. It
consists of implementations of various common types of graphs and it supports a wide assort-
ment of graphical features and output formats. The program started with the article of Gansner
et al. (1993). In this article they presented a collection of software that was designed to draw
graphs based on the following aesthetic principles:
A1. Expose hierarchical structure in the graph. In particular, aim edges in the same
general direction if possible. This aids finding directed paths and highlights source
and sink nodes. A2. Avoid visual anomalies that do not convey information about
the underlying graph. For example, avoid edge crossings and sharp bends. A3.
Keep edges short. This makes it easier to find related nodes and contributes to A2.
A4. Favor symmetry and balance. This aesthetic has a secondary role in a few
places in our algorithm. [p.214]
Graphviz has been used in several applications (e.g. displaying metabolic pathways, pro-
ducing class hierarchies and other diagrams directly from source code, displaying co-author
networks, to visualize clickpaths taken by users on websites, etc.17) to assist users to bet-
ter understand domain-specific information or to perform some tasks visually(Gansner, 2004;
Gansner and North, 2000). It has proven to draw very large graphs based on a lot of data.
Graphviz can give nodes and edges different shapes and colours on the basis of the input-
code. It can also generate and link subgraphs into a big graph. Also important is the fact that
nodes can be vertically ordered by given them ranks. This means that some nodes can be set
at a higher level in the graph then others. These elements are all very helpful for our analysis.
We can select different shapes of nodes for different types of owners and give edges different
colours that relate to different types of Hohfeld-relationships. The ability of the software to
draw subgraphs enable us to visualize the legal regime with subgraphs per policy area. With
the help of the ranking of nodes, we can recreate the different levels (international -¿ local) of
the legal regimes. These are all useful elements for our analysis.
This is all possible with the data in our database. With the help of PHP- and MySQL scripts
the relevant information for visualizing the legal system (entities = nodes, legal relations =
edges)18, is translated into a language that can be interpreted by Graphviz. This language is
called the DOT-language19. For a simple example generated by our tools, see below. It repre-





node [shape = record];
source license. The website of AT&T also contains several supporting documents and working papers, sample
layouts and links to various sites that describe and support software that incorporates or extends the different uses
of Graphviz.
17For an overview of tools and their application, look at http://www.graphviz.org/Resources.php.
18The formal model for this information can be found in section (6.2)
19See for more information about this language Gansner et al. (2002)
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{rank = same; "n0006"; "n0005";"n0001";"n0020";}
{rank = same; "n0008"; "n0016";"n0009";"n0018";}


















n0005 -> n0006 [color=coral, arrowhead=back]
n0007 -> n0005 [color=coral, arrowhead=back]
n0009 -> n0012 [color=lawngreen ]
n0008 -> n0005 [color=coral, arrowhead=back]
n0009 -> n0010 [color=lawngreen , style="setlinewidth(2)", arrowsize=2]
n0008 -> n0007 [color=aliceblue ]
n0008 -> n0011 [color=coral, arrowhead=back]
n0007 -> n0008 [color=aliceblue ]
n0009 -> n0007 [color=lawngreen , style="setlinewidth(2)", arrowsize=2]
n0009 -> n0008 [color=lawngreen ]
n0013 -> n0017 [color=yellow ]
n0013 -> n0005 [color=yellow , style="setlinewidth(2)", arrowsize=2]
n0013 -> n0018 [color=yellow ]
n0011 -> n0004 [color=coral ]
n0011 -> n0019 [color=coral ]
n0011 -> n0001 [color=lawngreen ]
n0011 -> n0020 [color=lawngreen ]
n0011 -> n0007 [color=coral, arrowhead=back, style="setlinewidth(2)", arrowsize=2]
n0011 -> n0008 [color=coral, arrowhead=back, style="setlinewidth(2)", arrowsize=2]
n0009 -> n0011 [color=lawngreen , style="setlinewidth(5)", arrowsize=2]
n0009 -> n0019 [color=lawngreen , style="setlinewidth(2)", arrowsize=2]
n0009 -> n0004 [color=lawngreen , style="setlinewidth(2)", arrowsize=2]
n0011 -> n0007 [color=coral ]
n0005 -> n0016 [color=lawngreen ]
n0018 -> n0021 [color=lawngreen ]
n0007 -> n0009 [color=coral ]
n0008 -> n0009 [color=coral ]
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n0009 -> n0009 [color=coral ]
}
The website is generating the code given above. This code should then be copy-pasted
into a text file (with extension .dot). This dot-file is subsequently selected as input for the
program Graphviz. With the help of one of its tools (also called dot), Graphviz can draw a
graph visualizing the legal regime (see figure 7.2). Several types of output can be selected,
ranging from jpeg and gif to ps and cmap.
Figure 1: Resulting graph from the dot-file
We have shown that it is possible to visualize the legal system per policy area with the help
of the MySQL and PHP scripts. But one can also limit the visualization to all the entities that
have a legal relation with a specific (selected) entity. This can be very helpful in determining
similarities and differences between or within legal systems.
7.3 Comparison
The comparison is made with the help of a few MySQL&PHP-scripts. Each new step in the
formal approach is reformulated in SQL-language. These SQL-scripts are then incorporated in
PHP-scripts in order to generate the necessary forms. With the help of these forms the SQL-
scripts can be executed, but also tuned (e.g. entities must be on the same level (or not)) to
specific needs. That way one is able to perform the required analysis with an minimum amount
of effort.
8 Future developments
The method we present in this paper is still under development and has not yet reached its full
potential. We are still learning and adapting the method and its tools to fulfil its task (more)
efficiently and effectively. In this section we will be discussing some elements that we will be
adding in the near future.
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8.1 Webdot
WebDot20 is a CGI program that converts a graph description from a .dot file into an image
that can be included on a web page. The idea is that our SQL and PHP scripts generating the
dot-language put this code directly in a file on our webserver. Filename and output format can
be selected by the user and WebDot can directly generate the image and render it at the website.
WebDot is also capable of generating images that can contain URLs. Both nodes and edges
can be made clickable. Our idea is to use this element of the tool to enhance the information
generating capabilities of the image. We would like to make the graphs so that users can click
on a node/entity. By clicking a new webpage will popup, which gives information about the
entity (attributes, in which policy areas the entity is active, its bundle of property rights, etc.)
and with which other entities this entity has a relation. By clicking at the edges one should be
linked to a webpage containing the content of the legal relations, which the edge represents.
This should greatly enhance the usability and function of the graphs.
8.2 Information cost analysis
As we have reported above, one has two options when analyzing property rights. One can
looking at what (constellation of rights) constitutes an owner or analyze the object to which an
owner is linked. In another paper of Van de Griendt van de Griendt (2005) we have presented
a method to make estimates about the relative order of magnitude of information costs that
the legal regime is generating. The same descriptions generated by ILT and Hohfeld hold also
the key for an information costs analysis with the help of Information Cost Theory of Smith
(2002, 2004a,b). This theory is based on the idea that one can make estimates on the levels of
information costs by looking to the objects and the legal relations that extend over it.
For determining the level of information costs, Smith argues that it is important to answer
two questions. The first is: What collection of attributes is treated as a unit for describing
permitted or forbidden activities? It is costly to define, monitor and enforce property rights,
because objects can be seen as a bundle of valuable attributes, which are individually costly
to measure. However, not all measurement methods are as costly. Due to these issues, people
setting up a system of property rights will try to economize on measurement/information costs.
They do this by using a more or less rough ‘proxy’21 for describing the property and the legal
relations among the legal actors. Detailed proxies have the benefit of being better able to
capture the (true) value of the property. But the more specified the rules, the more effort it will
take to communicate these rules to all users and for them to remember them and act accordingly.
Therefore more specific rules lead to higher costs of protecting the property. This way a trade-
off can be made between the costs and benefits of a more specific22 ‘proxy’.
20WebDot was written by John Ellson and is released under a BSD-style license. More information can be
found at http://www.site.uottawa.ca:4333/webdot/.
21The proxy functions as a referent for complex legal relationships. That way it reduces information costs
(Long, 2004).
22Sjaastad and Bromley (2000) describe in their article several processes for making rights more specific. There-
fore we like to say that specific means here ”more fragmented”.
Thus, rights that distinguish between access to different tree species are more detailed than rights
that do not, and rights that define access to grazing land in terms of different seasons are more
detailed than rights that do not. Detail is of relevance when rights are assigned in some manner
other than location (Sjaastad and Bromley, 2000, p.369).
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This leads us to the second question, namely which range of behaviour is allowed in relation
to this ‘proxy’. In other words, what are the legal relations between legal actors in relation to
the object to which the relations apply(Long, 2004)? When rough ‘proxies’ like borders are
used, a large class of activities, in an all-or-nothing way (Smith, 2004b), will be bundled and
not defined separately, because of the very crude methods of measurement. That way a set
of attributes becomes difficult to use without the right holder’s permission. Such proxies are
called exclusion rules. If an owner wants to protect his resource, he must make ‘exclusion
costs’. These are the costs of drawing and enforcing boundaries to restrict access to and use of
the resource to the owner(s) of the property (Cole, 2002) and the cost of monitoring.
Alternatively, the people setting up a property regime can also use governance rules. Gov-
ernance rules are rules which pick out uses and users in more detail and directly describe proper
use. These rules come with governance costs, namely the costs of negotiating arrangements,
coordinating decisions and monitoring and enforcing the rules set by the arrangement gov-
erning the usage of ((part of) one of the attributes of) the property. These costs are initially
higher then exclusion costs, because it is difficult to separate the effects of the different uses
and coordinate the activities of the different users.
Exclusion and governance are opposites differing in the proxies selected. That does not
mean that when setting up a property regimes one must choose for either one. They are poles
of a continuum, with hybrid solutions in between. To estimate the level of costs associated
with the legal regime it is not necessary to make an accurate calculation. We can make these
estimates by determining the level of specification of the proxy. This level will be somewhere
between the level of total specification and total absence of specification. Total specification
means that for every use of every attribute every potential Hohfeldian relation23 is specified
between every pair of members of the society. Total absence of specification is a situation where
no rules are set and no property rights are assigned. By comparing the levels of specification of
the proxies defined by the legal regimes, one can observe if one legal regime has a higher level
of information costs associated with it then the other(s).
The level of specification can be determined with the information stored in the database.
For every rule it is already stored to which proxy (prox),this rule is related. Combined with the
content of the rule (co) and the Hohfeld relation (hf ) one can determine the number of Hohfeld
relations and the attributes discerned. The idea is that in the future all this information can be
gathered with a click at one of the buttons at our website.
8.3 Extension of formal model
The last development of our method is an extension of the formal model to establish equiva-
lences between legal rules. We propose to add a level 4 analysis. This level should build upon
the analysis of levels 2 and 3 and look if there legal relations between the target entity and its
peer that have the same type of Hohfeld relation which regulates the same content. This is the
strongest test one can use to determine if there two legal regimes are equal or not.
23Paragraph 5.2 is dedicated to Hohfeld and his legal relations.
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9 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown a method and its tools to analyze and compare legal regimes
for integrated management of multi-use and multi-user common pool resources in order to
determine their level of (de)centralization and its ability to adapt. The method is based on
the idea that legal regimes can be described by looking at the legal institutions they contain.
Institutional Legal Theory and Hohfeld give one a useful typology for describing respectively
the form and content of these legal institutions in terms of their ‘underlying unities’. This
enables a researcher to make unbiased comparisons. The descriptions of legal regimes can
also be used for assessing the level of (de)centralization of the legal regimes, by looking at the
property rights they assign to different actors. By examining the bundle of property rights hold
by the different actors, one can determine their type of ownership and assess at which level of
organization the legal regime can be adapted to local situations.
With the help of the combination of legal and economic institutional theories and the web-
based database system and the tools we have developed that implement the method in order to
perform (semi)automatic analysis, we think that we have made a first step towards the devel-
opment of a method that can helps us draw conclusions about the way in which structural dif-
ferences can explain differences in performance of legal regimes governing aquatic resources.
Reaching this goal becomes easier if the future developments are no longer on the ‘to do’ list,
but an integral part of our system and tools.
The next step to reach the research goal set by Agrawal (2001) would then be to develop a
method that looks at the performance of the legal regimes in a way that its results can be related
to the structural differences as determined by the method presented in this paper.24
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